The Affordances of Emotion (part 3)

In the past two posts I have been playing with the idea that interoceptive perceptions (i.e., “feelings”) have and can have affordances. Just as a teacup proposes, is associated with, and enables a range of potential responses, interactions, functions, and utilities, so, too, do the feelings that reside within our body. True, emotions themselves are responses, and emotional regulation can partially involve an appreciation for the situational / exteroceptive triggers for the emotional response. Emotions, though, in addition to being responses are also feelings. That is, they are structured perceptions in their own right, and have been designed just as much as a teacup has been designed. The designer in this case being some combination of ontogeny and phylogeny. 

http://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/8299. What is the meaning of a teacup? What functions and interactions are possible?

The perceptions of boredom, grief, pride, and pleasure, for example, all suggest and can be associated with a range of behaviors. Someone honks at us, we seethe inside, experiencing “road rage” and after a bout of cursing, we give the honker finger. The feeling of road rage in this instance has the affordance of cursing and giving the finger, or perhaps some other generalized stressor (an unhappy marriage) is the true origin, sensitizing us to perceived slights and aggravations, and hence the response of road rage. Either way, the finger is given.

Another teacup, but we call it road rage. What is the meaning of a road rage? What functions and interactions are possible with this designed object?

However, this wasn’t the only potential response we might have made. There is the deep breath and a count to 10. There are reflective questions, “Why exactly am I feeling this? What is this feeling trying to do for me?” There is broadening out of perspective and a chuckle about how silly the whole thing is. All of these and more are potential affordances to the feeling of “road rage.” But normally, we just give the finger, just as normally racists scream at the first blacks who dared to attend white only schools, or just as normally fear leads us to deny our own accountability. We might even tell ourselves the story that our feelings justified the behavior – a story which itself might be an affordance of the feeling. “They made me angry, so of course I was going to lash out. What did they expect.” But of course, feelings do not justify behaviors any more than a teacup justifies lifting it to the mouth with by the handle. In each case behaviors are “suggested” and then selected. We might even say that the meaning is created  – more or less strongly – by the design of the percept and the history of our interactions with it. There is no justification, only behavioral options, only affordance.

Learning a new affordance, not just for a potty, but also for the feeling (interoceptive percept) that signals imminent defecation. Emotions are the only feelings we possess and for which new affordances are possible.

Take, for example and in honor of the last post’s reference to Duchamp, a scenario with which every parent is well-acquainted – potty training. Potty training is a case of training an affordance to a feeling state. The parent does not have direct access to the feeling state in their child that precedes defecation. Nonetheless, the goal of potty training is to associate new behaviors – “holding it in” and “using a toilette” – with the interoceptive perception of needing to pee or poop. Prior to this association, the child presumably just peed or pooped, just as when we feel road rage, we just shake our fist / give the finger or after an argument with a loved one, maybe we withdraw and give them the silent treatment. But through training almost all children learn the new affordance of “feeling the need to defecate” –> seek out a toilette –> use a toilette. 

So, feeling states can be associated with new behaviors. Feeling the need to defecate does not justify peeing in public on the brick façade of a house. Of course, what makes training new affordances to emotional states a more difficult proposition is their relatively rarity. The individual wracked with grief. What are the affordances of this state? Reaching out for social support? Narrative-making that adjusts the value of the missing object? Narrative making that adjusts the value of the self? These are all potential affordances for grief, sure. But notice that part of what makes grief so tricky is that we experience it so rarely. How are we to learn the “going to the bathroom response” for grief? For jealousy? For ecstatic joy? For gratitude? For pride? For attachment (which is not the same thing as love)? We need to defecate multiple times a day. How often, though, do we get to practice new behaviors for jealousy? How often do we get sit with our anger or fear and really pay attention to designed contours of the perception and the affordances that the perception is suggesting? This is doubly true when the affordances, themselves, eliminate access to the originating emotion. We experience abandonment by a loved and feel threat or fear or sadness and respond with self-belittling, or emotional suppression, or a reactive pushing away of the very thing we wish were closer. When it comes to so many of the feelings that we term emotions, then, we are largely left, with the affordances given to us unthinkingly by natural selection or uninvestigated psychological processes. 

Searchlights behind St. Paul’s cathedral in London, England during an air raid in World War one. Drawn by Joseph Pennell, 1914. I like to think of this image as a metaphor for the affordances that are attached to our feeling states. In many cases these responses appear to come out of no where and to carry with them an intentionality akin to darkness and vague forms.

There is much more that could be unpacked here, but in this post, I am going to only consider two affordances for our feeling states: projection and state-dependent memory. Ultimately, many forms of cognitive behavioral therapy and somatic therapy are centered on deconstructing the affordances individuals have attached to interoceptive cues and introducing / training new behavioral possibilities. My goal isn’t to review any of that literature, but rather to sensitize the reader to the idea that interoceptive perceptions are designed perceptions and that the available affordances are more varied and subtle than we might think 

I like this image because is captures the idea that projection moves us from description of the other to interpretation of the other. In other words projection as a first pass at empathy. At its best it “gets us in the game.” At its worst it selfishly negates the unique lived experience of others.

Projection. Let’s start with projection. Classically, projection is classified as a psychological defense mechanism. The story goes that certain triggers will produce a feeling state akin to “threat”… the masked knife wielder at the door of the self. For example, an individual who has learned an anxious attachment style in their childhood finds someone who genuinely loves them as an adult. This triggers a profound sense of threat / lack of safety / distrust in the anxiously attached individual, but such emotions threaten the self. After all, I’m not a person worthy of love. So, what is this other person hiding, this person who “claims” to love me? Certainly, they are up to something, and the evidence is out there if only I will look hard enough. Such are the outlines of projection. For example, in one study by Neal and Lemay (2019) heterosexual relationships were tracked. If an individual in a relationship experienced attraction to individuals outside the relationship, they were prone to 1) feel that their partner had a “wandering eye,” and also 2) report an increase in negative feelings and behaviors directed toward their partner. But notice that psychological defense mechanisms are affordances. They are responses (mostly unconscious) suggested by an emotional state as much as road rage suggests giving someone the finger or the feeling of needing to pee suggests finding a bathroom. Projection is an affordance of interoceptive perception.

Many roads in psychology lead to Freud, and it’s only fitting that this is a street sign from Paris’ 19th arrondissement. Freudian defense mechanisms are affordances attached to interoceptive perceptions / feelings.

Interestingly, projection as a defense mechanism doesn’t appear to hold up. That is, although projection is common, it does not appear primarily to serve the function of ego protection classically assigned to it [see also “assumed similarity” and “the false consensus effect”]. What then is the function of projection? First, stated simply, projection is the assumption that others share our own emotional state. This assumption, itself, makes certain outcomes more likely. If I experience a crush on someone, and I assume that the other person shares that feeling (i.e., project my feelings of attraction onto the other person), then I am more likely to engage in behaviors that potentially establish a relationship with that person. We can also think of projection as a being a first pass in which our own emotions fill in a “blindspot,” which is the interiority of other individuals. We don’t have access to the interiority of others, so projection can be thought of a hypothesis — the setting out of a possibility — the TYPE of story that can be told GIVEN the emotional landscape of the moment.

State-dependent Memory. I’m going to close out this discussion of affordances by considering one more set of often overlooked responses that are attached to our interoceptive perceptions, namely memory recall. I will acknowledge that we are stretching the concept of response here. Is recalling the face of a loved one really the same as sitting down in a chair? Obviously not, but sitting down in a chair is not the same as feeling angry, but both are responses. Similarly, recall as a response can be practiced and improved, and no one would argu with the fact that certain situations are more likely to trigger certain memories. In this sense, then, recall is a response to perceptions, and we can therefore include recall in the bucket of affordances.

Recall is a type of response, and when we say that an object triggered a memory, we are saying that the object affords the recall of that memory. Feeling states also trigger particular memories, which means that one of the affordances of these states is memory recall. Of course, the same could be said of a teacup.

State-dependent memory refers to the finding that individuals more readily recall memories when the interoceptive state at recall matches the state at encoding. Put into more normal language, if a memory is stored when you are happy, you are more likely to recall the memory when you are once again happy. Rats taught an escape response while under the influence of a drug, more readily demonstrated the escape response when they were again under the influence of the drug vs. not. Students who studied while intoxicated (or not intoxicated) performed best on the subsequent test when they were the same state as they studied. And of course depression is at least partially characterized by the depressed individual finding it difficult to recall moments in which they were ever happy. The point here, is to appreciate that the recall of memories that we carry with us in any particular moment are at least partially the responses of – affordances of – our feeling states.

Summary: What do emotions mean? On one level, that is the question that this and the last two posts have been addressing, but by emphasizing the fact that emotions are designed “objects.” What does a teacup mean? When we speak of designed objects, we are making assumptions about functions and potential interactions and responses to the object. I’ve been using the term “affordances” to link functions and potential responses to our perceptions. So, stated differently, designed objects have affordances which is to say “suggested” interactions and responses. That is one answer to the question, “What does a teacup mean?” We pivot to emotions by recognizing that normally, we think of designed objects as existing outside of the organism. However, our emotional states are also designed objects (as well as being learned responses). In that sense, emotional states also have affordances that have been given by natural selection, but also by learning. That is at least partially their “meaning.” My hope is that framing interoceptive perception in this manner makes us more curious and opens us up to exploring the range of affordances and hence meaning made available by our feeling states.

The Affordances of Emotion (part 2)

In the last post I introduced the concept of affordances. I will admit that my take on the concept is somewhat idiosyncratic. In the design of user interfaces (my favorite book on this topic is still The Design of Everyday Things by Donald Norman) the concept is mainly restricted to perceptions of function: door handles are for pulling (not pushing), door panels are for pushing (not pulling), and raising an electric window makes more “sense” when the switch is pulled upward rather than pushed down. Having started using computers prior to touchscreens it “makes sense” to me that pulling down with my mouse will move me forward in a document. For my students pushing up is the more natural way of moving forward in a document. In other words, those who design objects for various functions do well to be aware of the responses that are typically occasioned by the perception of the user. We shouldn’t need a user’s manual for every on of the tools in our lives! 

Figure taken from Joseph Friedman’s patent application for the “bendy straw.”

The active design of objects, though, also changes the affordances of a situation. Consider the design of the “bendy straw.” The illustration above (Patent #: US2094268 A) is from 1937, and was granted to Joseph B.  Friedman. Mr.  Friedman’s journey began with taking his young daughter to soda fountains. At the time milkshakes and other drinks were generally served out of tall bottles and / or glasses. Since straws were straight they elevated where drinking occurred. For a young drinker, tipping a glass filled with milkshake in order to get the straw to the mouth sometimes caused milkshake to spill out of the glass. However, bending the straw to the mouth was also not a solution. As Friedman writes in his patent application:

In order to drink in any satisfactory manner through the straw, it is either necessary to take the glass or bottle in the hand and tilt it, or to lean forward and bend the face down to contact the straw with the mouth.  Either of these procedures is awkward and it is extremely common for the straws to become bent and broken over the rim of the bottle or glass during the consumption of the liquid.  As the straws are substantially cylindrical such bending greatly obstructs the lumen of the straw and reduces the amount of liquid which can be drawn there through.  (Friedman 1936, US patent application 2094268).  

Friedman’s “aha” moment involved taking one of the paper straws of the day, inserting a screw, and tightly winding a string around the screw’s ridges. After removing the screw, one was left with a bendable straw. Mr.  Friedman had intended that his bendy straw be used at soda fountains. One of the earliest adaptors, though, were hospitals because it became evident that bendable straws enabled bed-ridden patients to drink liquids while lying in bed.

However, rather than focusing on technology design, the psychologist who first proposed affordances as a term, James Gibson, mainly used the concept to capture a sense of what the external environment (i.e., its perception by the organism) “offers” the organism (see an excerpt here and Wikipedia here). Actions connected with threat and play, drowning and swimming, bathing, splashing, drinking, cooling off… all might be “afforded” to an individual by the sight of a pond. Gibson’s point was to stress that an animal is rarely, if ever, passively situated in its environment, and that action is a fundamental component of perception. As the environment changes so too do the potential behaviors. 

My own use of the term in the last post leaned more in the design direction, while emphasizing that our evolutionary history, learning and maturation layer our perceptions with actionable meaning. But importantly, I tried to make the point that what is obviously the “correct” course of action – at least in terms of the most likely behavior to appear in a situation — might in fact be akin to an illusion. There are instances in which our perceptions conspire like a classical artist to restrict our attention to what resides within the painting’s ornate frame.

Frame is also perceived context, and reaching out can be as much of an affordance as an interpretative appraisal. This latter point will be important to keep in mind when we consider the affective affordances we perceive in our environments. Remember, emotions are both a form of responding and a perceptual state in their own right. This is a photo by Alfred Stieglitz of Marcel Duchamp’s famous / infamous work of “art,” the Fountain. Image in the public domain.

Given that brief aside, what I would like to do in this post is to consider the affordances of emotions and feelings. Just as we should be aware of and question the perceptual frame that weights our actions with regard to the external environment, so too should we question the perceptual frame that weights our actions with regards to our interoceptive environment. Notice that I am NOT referring to the affective affordances of external objects (see Carava & Benenti, 2024). I might feel the need to wallow in bout of melancholy romanticism and turn to the movie Before Sunset to help me experience this emotion. Or I might doom scroll through social media as a way of mitigating anxiety. Such affective affordances are not what I am referring to here. Rather, I would like to consider interoceptive feelings as their own perceptions that are capable of affording particular actions in their own right.

“Baby, you are gonna miss that plane.” If you know, you know.

My stance will be the same as that taken in the last post – to consider interoceptive perceptions as differentially weighting different types of action. But also, I will want to hold on to a very broad definition of afforded actions. Just as an emotional response (fear of failure, fear of exposure, etc.) is an affordance that might be “suggested” to you by the prospect of having to speak up in class, our recall of particular memories and interpretative stances are also actions. Consider Duchamp’s urinal above. Part of the fame attached to this work of art concerns the interpretive expectations triggered by our perceptions. A Michelangelo sculpture affords a certain esthetic reverence. A urinal affords thoughts of contamination and excrement. Duchamp’s insight was to purposefully conflate the two. In considering the potential affordances of our visceral beliefs we will likewise attempt to hold on to an unrestricted notion of the potential action space. 

For example, we all know that social behaviors such as communication are actions afforded to us by our interoceptive cues. A doctor asks us to report how much pain we are feeling on a scale of 1 – 10, or a friend asks us how we are feeling. “About a 7” and “Tired” might be the responses that our interoceptive perception affords. But of course, feeling possess more than just verbal affordances. Happiness affords smiles and anger affords scowls, and an infant cries in order to be held or because of gas pains or because of hunger (and it is up to the exasperated parent to determine which is which). In fact, we spend considerable time trying to train other behaviors to our internal perceptions in order to hide and control how and when we express our internal states. Since communicative actions are so obviously suggested by our interoceptive perceptions, I am not going to address them here. Instead, I would like consider three other, not so obvious actions afforded to us by our interoceptive perceptions: behavior systems, state-dependent memory, and interpretive projection.

From Charles Darwin’s The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. I am always struck by how these individuals are long dead — the experienced happiness of the individuals a fleeting moment in their existence and somehow all the more precious for it.

Let’s begin just as we did with the last post with a puzzle. A rat in a cage is given a running wheel. Anyone who has had a pet rodent knows what happens. The rat will spend some time each day scurrying in the running wheel. What we are going to do, though, is run an experiment in which we force the animal to go hungry for some amount of time each day. Maybe we provide food for the animal for 4 hours per day, or maybe 2 hours per day, or maybe just 1 hour per day. Being good scientists, we have two groups of rats. For one group we do not provide a running wheel, and what we will observe is that all of the animals manage just fine. Those provided with food for only an hour per day, spend the majority of that time eating, while those given access to the food for 4 hours, will eat intermittently during those 4 hours. The important thing to note, though, is that all of these rats will maintain a stable body weight.

From Scheurink et al (2010). The graph shows days on the x-axis and km run in the running wheel by each group of rats on the y-axis. Groups of rats differed in how many hours of access they had to food per day. Notice that the group that had 1-hour access per day is continuing to increase its running, and would in fact run itself to death if the experiment were not stopped.

For our other group, we make one change. We provide these rats with a running wheel. What we will see in this group is a phenomenon known as activity-based anorexia (see Carera et al, 2014). First, greater food restriction will lead to greater time spent in the running wheel. In the graph below, the rats who are receiving 1 hour of food per day are running 10 km in their running wheels! What has also been shown, though, is that the rats in the 1 hour of food per day, will cease to maintain a stable body weight. In fact, if the experiment is not stopped, many of these rats will continuously lose weight, and eventually run themselves to death. How do we explain this?

One potential approach is via what is known as behavior systems theory (see Carbrera et al, 2019) Behavior systems can be thought of as the loose set of reflexes that are attached to functional states such as foraging, reproduction, status seeking, the rearing of young, and so forth. The figure below shows a set of behavior systems for foraging. Depending on the animal, the individual might start a bout of foraging by socializing before setting out with the group to look for food. Or the animal might search out a spot to lie in wait, hidden. Once a food item is located, though, a different set of behaviors come to the fore, and once a food item is being consumed, yet another set of behaviors become more likely. An astute observer will notice that behavior systems are simply affordances by another name. 

So, let’s consider what perceptions might underpin the functional state that affords a particular behavior system. The sight of prey. The feel and smell of the food item, for sure. But what of the sensation of hunger, itself? To be placed into a functional state is to exist within a particular interoceptive perceptual space, and it is this perceptual space that is affording the behaviors in a behavioral system. Bucks during rutting season compete with other males and attempt to copulate with females. Horny teenagers congregate in packs and compete for status and attention. A child in a dark basement hears a sound and flees for the safety of the lighted steps. In each case, a functional state presumably correlates with a feeling state, and this feeling state affords actions just as much as the sight of a tea pot. 

A hypothetical behavior system related to hunger / foraging. Notice that behaviors early in the system (at the top) will tend to change the environment in ways that will then bring about subsequent behaviors. The idea here is that many of our emotions / feeling states / interoceptive situations afford behavioral systems. That is, the state is connected to our evolutionary fitness.

For example, from the figure above, an animal experiencing hunger is most likely to show general search behaviors. And (if you are rat) that means movement. Normally, these behaviors would cause prey or food to appear, and then normally the exteroceptive perception of this prey would lead to consumption behaviors. But in the laboratory, our poor animal is stuck. We have removed the normal contingencies of the behavioral system. The hungry animal increases its locomotion, but this does not produce a food item, and only serves to increase the interoceptive hunger cues, which in turn “suggest” the behavior of locomotion. It’s a vicious cycle, but one that is at least partially made sense of by appreciating that interoceptive perceptions (in this case, hunger) afford particular sorts of behavior just as much as exteroceptive perceptions do. It’s just that for whatever reason we tend to change our terminology. We don’t say that the hammer hitting our knee compelled us to kick out. But we do say that we felt compelled to eat the cupcake that was in front of us. The only difference, at least from within our discussion of affordances, is that in one case the perception is external while in the other the perception is internal. In both cases a behavior or set of behaviors is being strongly weighted (or primed) by the perceived situation.

So, when we speak of interoceptive “feeling states” (e.g., emotions, motivations) we should be aware that systems of behaviors are likely to be afforded to these internal “situations.” We feel guilt and behaviors that involve making amends will be suggested. We feel anger and behaviors that remove obstacles or exact payment will be suggested. We feel disgust and behaviors that lessen the likelihood of contamination will be suggested. We feel love and behaviors that care for the other will be suggested.

[Aside. I was educated in the behaviorist tradition, and therefore feel somewhat “dirty” using terminology such as “affordances” and “feeling states” and so forth. However, there are many flavors of behaviorism and I am much more aligned with the behaviorism of Clark Hull than B.F. Skinner. Hull made much use of “drive stimuli” in many of his models of learning, and what is a “drive stimulus” but an interoceptive perception / feeling state? Also, contra Skinner, I don’t think that operant conditioning is the be-all-and-end-all for understanding a behaving organism. For a nice summary of some of the current approaches to decision making and behavior see Redish, 2015). Finally, a crude behaviorism has a way of absenting the particular organism from the explanatory situation. Affordances to my thinking are more species specific, and do a better job of conceptually situating the individual organism in their immediate, perceived environment (internal and external).]

The Affordances of Emotion (part 1)

I am going to try and play with a few ideas in this post, but big picture, at their nexus lies a simple question: Do emotions have affordances, and if so, what are they? So, let’s start with affordances, but in a round-about way.

Imagine that you have been placed in a room. Two strings hang down from the ceiling a certain distance apart. In the room is also a chair and a pair of scissors. Your captor tells you that if you can grab ahold of both strings, they will let you free. The only problem is that the strings are positioned such that if you clutch one of the strings and walk towards the other, that other string remains just out of reach. What do you do?

Here’s another one. Below are nine dots arranged in a square. Your task is to take a pen or pencil (or use your mouse pad) and draw no more than 4 lines that connect all of the dots.

Or here is one more. You are a chimp living at the Anthropoid Station in Tenerife during WWI. A German researcher named Wolfgang Koehler has suspended a treat just out of your reach. Sometimes the treat is dangling up in the air, and crates are strewn about your enclosure. Sometimes the treat is on the ground beyond the enclosure’s fencing. In these cases there are sticks available. What do you do?

Scan taken from The Mentality of Apes (1921) by Wolfgang Koehler

These types of problems are known as “insight problems.” Insight problems tend to have what is called an “ah-ha” moment. The person doing the puzzle repeatedly bangs their head against a wall, until suddenly the solution emerges as if in one conceived whole. The chimp might reach out towards the suspended treat. It might become visibly frustrated and hurl crates about the enclosure. What Wolfgang Koehler observed, though, was that sometimes after these displays, a chimp might pause and look back and forth between the crate (or stick) and the treat. After this pause, the chimp would suddenly go over to the crate, drag it under the treat, climb up, and pull the treat in. Or the chimp would grab the stick, reach out, and pull the treat into the enclosure. The learning (i.e., achievement of the desired outcome) was not gradual, but sudden. Take the problem of connecting the dots, remember that no one said that your lines couldn’t extend outside of the implied boundaries of the square. Or take the problem of the strings, no one said that a pair of scissors has to be used for cutting. Scissor handles can be tied to strings and used as a weight to start the string swinging.

There is a lot that could be said about insight problems and insight learning, levels of selection and units of selection. I wrote an entire master’s thesis-equivalent on the topic! And that was many, many years ago prior to much additional research that has come out since. For the purposes of this post, though, let’s just appreciate that one common aspect of insight problems is something known as “functional fixedness.” This is the idea that certain objects and situations “suggest” certain actions / behaviors. These suggestions can be more or less “strong.” We see a pair of scissors and the suggestion is, “Scissors are for cutting!” We see nine dots arranged in a square, and we assume that the implicit edges of the arranged dots are a boundary. For chimps, crates aren’t for dragging. Maybe for climbing on top of, but for dragging?? Really? And sticks. They are for poking. Maybe scratching. But for extending one’s reach in a generic sense? For Koehler, who belonged to a school of psychology known as the “gestalt psychology,” the rules (what I have termed “beliefs” in earlier posts) that constructed perceptions were central to how the environment made available different courses of action.

The functional fixedness that defines many types of insight problems essentially says that sometimes perception very strongly suggests particular actions. We see a button, we press it. We see a chair, we sit on it. We see a book, we open it (or throw it across the room). We see chalk and a chalk board, we write or draw on the board. Our perception isn’t just a description of the world, but also a call to action. It is this connection between perception and action that lies at the heart of the concept of affordances.

The orchid is triggering copulation in the digger wasp in order to benefit its own pollination (image captured from “10 things you didn’t know about orchids.“

Or let’s come at this a different way by considering reflexes. We can think of reflexes as a particularly simple call to action, although reflexes, modal action patterns, and reflex chains can be highly complex. In this case were are not talking about “emitted behavior” or skills and habits that we have learned through trial and error, but rather “elicited behavior.” The suggestion from perception is an imperative: thou shalt use the scissors to cut! Only it’s not scissors but puffs of air to the eye, taps to the patella, the smell (to a male dog) of a female dog in heat, a viral invasion of a body, memories of a traumatic event, or the soft cloth to the motherless monkey… In each of these cases, perception mandates action, which is to say that the action feels involuntary. The eye blinks. The foot shoots up. The male dog jumps the fence and pursues the female. The immune system responds. The skin conductance goes up and the pituitary gland releases hormones. The soft texture evokes attachment / feelings of comfort and safety. And yes, emotions can be as much of a response as the blink of an eye – i.e., emotional responses are contained in an animal’s “affordances” as much as a stick may be used for poking and scratching and reaching and throwing and whittling. Perception suggests these behaviors, but also the behaviors of anger, contentment, sadness, stress, and humor. Emotions are responses and therefore suggestions for action made by our perceptions.

From the work of Harry Harlow. This image is in the public commons and is from research Harlow conducted on stimulation that triggers “emotional attachment” in young rhesus monkeys.

Zooming back out, though, the point here is that perception is not just a description of a world (and remember, exteroception perceives the world outside the body, while interoception perceives the world OF the body). Perception is also a weighted suggestion of all sorts of an actions — suggestions with differences in probability, urgency, intensity, and obviousness. Take reflexes. It might be reasonable to assume that our strongest call to action will be elicited by naturally occurring stimuli. A parental gull returns from foraging. The gull chicks peck at the red dot at the base of the parent’s yellow beak. The parent regurgitates food for the chicks to eat. Red dot on a yellow beak suggests pecking, or since we are talking about a reflex, red dot on yellow beak compels pecking in the hungry chick. Except it turns out that there are other perceptions that compel even more pecking. Affordances can be hacked. It turns out that more compelling than the naturally occurring red dot at the base of a parent’s yellow beak are several red lines drawn at the tip of a yellow rod. This, this is the better parent, at least if determined by the vigor of pecking made by the hungry gull chicks (Tinbergen & Perdeck).   

Two very handsome birds!! From the article “A Taste for the beautiful: Latent aesthetic mate preferences for white crests in two species of Australian grassfinches by Burley and Symanski. See the link in the text.

The finding that the “best” stimulus for eliciting a reflex might not be a naturally occurring stimulus is captured by the idea of a supernormal stimulus. Basically, a supernormal stimulus is to reflexes what functional fixedness is to insight learning. Glue a long, white feather to a male grass finch’s head, and it becomes very attractive to females (Burley & Symanski). Provide a nesting oyster catcher with an unnaturally large egg, and it becomes the preferred egg to brood. Provide a female platyfish with a male to which you’ve affixed an artificial “sword tail,” and that males become highly desirable, compared to the normally swordless males (Basolo). There are many examples of supernormal stimuli that have been researched, and like visual illusions they tell us something about how our minds construct their beliefs about the world. In the case of affordances – that recursive network of perceptions to actions — whether we are aware of the whispered suggestions or not, our minds are an ecosystem of hows-to-engage. 

Memes… So much said in such minimal visuals.

Now, though, I would like to pivot. Normally, affordances are thought of in terms of exteroceptive perception, or perception of the world “out there.” A chair, the smell of baked bread, an approaching bear “suggests” certain types of behavior… and remember, emotions are a behavior. But we also have perceptions of the world “in here.” That it, we have feelings. Emotions in other words are both a suggested action, but also a perception. So, a reasonable question is what sorts of affordances are attached to these interoceptive perceptions. What are the affordances of anger, of delight, of boredom, of hunger, of body aches and a runny nose? I am going to argue for a couple of possibilities. First interoceptive states / perceptions broadly structure sets of behavior into behavior systems. Second, interoceptive states suggest certain types of memory recall (and yes, “remembering” is an action). Third, interoceptive states are fundamentally responsible for turning exteroceptive description into interpretation. That is, just as our brains actively fill in the blind spots of our exteroceptive, visual world, one of the actions called up by our interoceptive states is projection. We’ll get to all of these in the next blog post.