Author: mark_cleaveland
Visceral beliefs

Not all beliefs are spoken – at least not in the way that I’ve been unpacking the term so far in this blog. We have beliefs that we articulate, but we also have beliefs concerning what we see and hear. We have beliefs about what is in the future (anticipations, predictions, hopes, expectations, etc.) and beliefs about what has transpired in the past (memories, post-hoc rationalizations, etc.). Our consciously experienced reality is in a sense nothing but belief – a constructed amalgam of history within which we each reside…indeed, within which the totality of our lived existence transpires. We see an external world, but that external world is constructed for us according the imperatives of a history embodied in the form of an eye, the tunings of neurons, and the expectations of experience. At some point I do want to pivot and think through what sort of freedom and responsibility this science permits, because I don’t think that it therefore follows that anything goes – that the mechanistic churnings of historical contingency eradicate morality or freedom. More that these things are a choice and can’t merely be taken for granted. In answer to question from Waterland a few posts back, “Does this mean that the individual never happened / doesn’t matter?” No. But we can only make that assertion when we understand what, exactly, that individual is.
So, I’d like to sit a bit longer with how our embodied beliefs of psyche are constructed. This post is going to start rummaging through a set of perceptions I’m going to term “visceral beliefs.” These are things like pain, emotions, motivations (hunger, thirst, fatigue), but I’m going to focus on emotions in this post.
This past week it just so happens that I went to see “A Beautiful Day in the Neighborhood” with my parents. A few days later we went to hear a performance of excerpts from Handel’s Messiah. The connection? Emotion. When I was a kid – maybe 10, I remember the first time that I heard Handel’s Messiah. It was on a set of vinyl records (I think). Anyway, what I remember is not being able to get enough of the shivers the music sent through me – a weave of layered voices, voices calling out and responding, solitary and unified, and yeah, that Hallelujah chorus! I don’t know how my parents stayed sane, because my memory is of playing the vinyl records over-and-over-and-over-and-over. The reaction I remember having then, is the same reaction that I’ve since had watching an athlete perform at an the unexpected level, or a child returning with bandages to help an injured animal, or a group of people rising to stand in solidarity with an individual, or a red car in space with earth in the background. That reaction, that emotion is something that I connect to potential. A participatory wonder and exhilaration in raw human potential.
The world, though, isn’t necessarily designed for wonder. A book that I once assigned for a seminar, entitled Reality is Broken, essentially argues the societal imperatives of the 21st c. U.S. have minimized the emotions of wonder and exhilaration. Specifically, essential motivations connected with feelings of autonomy, competence, and meaningful social interactions have been removed from our daily experience. This is why, according to the author Jane McGonigal so many individuals have turned to games and virtual environments. Only in these environments do they encounter the sense of raw potential that they crave. In a sense this theme is no different from that found in the book The Giver. A colorlessness. An imposed blindness. And this is how “A Beautiful Day in the Neighborhood” comes in. The movie is essentially an episode of Mr. Rogers for adults. An emotionally stunted, “blinded” protagonist learns to attend to his emotions, to accept them, and to own their meaning. Mr. Rogers is the guide, and the protagonist follows him into a place of, well, new potential. What was unseen becomes seen. As William Carlos William’s writes:
so much depends
upon
a red wheel
barrow
glazed with rain
water
beside the white
chickens

This poem is partially about seeing. Noticing. Attending, and it is a beautiful poem. I’m mentioning it, though, because a similar poem could be written for the perceptions that we label “emotions.” So much depends upon a feeling of sadness, or a feeling of joy, or a feeling of contentment, or a feeling of urgency. If a wheelbarrow is worthy of notice – and it is – then the emotional landscapes we inhabit are equally worthy of notice.
Emotions are curious things. We are taught the need to control them, and some of us even have a fear and an embarrassment of them. An emotional reaction to emotion! Classically, too, emotions have been held to be in opposition to reason. Reason = good = human. Emotions = bad = animalistic. The thing is, though, emotions are merely another type of perception. They are really no different from vision or smell or hearing. Would we say that vision = bad = animalistic? And yet to denigrate emotional information is really no different from purposefully wearing a blindfold throughout the day.
But what kind of information is contained in an emotion? Well, as I pointed out a while back, our perceptions are constructed things. They are beliefs about the world, and illusions are fun because they remind us of this fact. I apparently have beliefs about color and shade and times of day, and these beliefs construct for me a gold and white dress where others have constructed within their psychological interior a blue and black dress. Likewise, the Hermann grid illusion produces beliefs about discolorations that are not actually present.

This is an illusion that is apparently created by the manner in which our brains respond to vertical and horizontal lines.
Emotions, too, are a form of perception. They don’t “just happen” any more than yellow and white dresses “just happen.” Emotions are constructed things. They are a perception or set of beliefs, albeit of visceral sensations. So, in that sense (ha! intended pun, there) emotions are visceral beliefs. In fact, I’d argue that the term “visceral belief” is a much more accurate expression than “emotion.” Here is the entymology for “emotion“:
1570s, “a (social) moving, stirring, agitation,” from Middle French émotion (16c.), from Old French emouvoir “stir up” (12c.), from Latin emovere “move out, remove, agitate,” from assimilated form of ex “out” (see ex-) + movere “to move”
Culturally, then, emotions are things that cause agitation – a stirring up from the inside. However, is gratitude a type of “stirring up” from the inside? Is depression? Is contentment? Or let me ask a different question. Is “age” an emotion? Is it a motivation? Is it a belief? From the perspective of psychology the answer is yes and yes and yes. Age is a visceral thing. A set of visceral stimuli that we psychologically “read,” build upon, learn about, and fit like a puzzle piece into cultural / social systems. In other words, we feel it. We might not attend to the feelings of “age” or have any basis for comparison or prefer to look at its “sensation scale” (i.e., more or less feelings of age / youth) from one direction vs. another, but regardless, age is a sensation, a perception that originates in the body. “Youth is wasted on the young.” “I am 40 years young.” “I’m really feeling my age, today.” All of these expressions relate to the feelings that we term “age.”
These feelings of “age” are real, and age is certainly both an objective measure as well as a feeling. But when we use that word “feeling” what we are speaking of is a perception that originates in the body. If vision is a set of constructed beliefs about “things out there,” feelings are a set of constructed beliefs of “things in here” – where “here” is the body you inhabit. The precise terms are exteroceptive vs interoceptive stimuli. Exteroceptive stimuli are those that originate from outside the body, while interoceptive stimuli originate from within the body. Interoceptive stimuli are the change in body temperature, the constriction of blood vessels, the beat of the heart, the tingling rush of adrenalin, the vertigo, the rise of body hair, the rhythm of a walk, the roil of the stomach.

Here is a figure to help visualize all of this. Perception is the category of experience given by our senses. Some of those senses respond to information that originates outside the body (sound waves, light waves, chemicals, pressure, etc.) while some of those senses respond to information that originate from inside the body. This latter category is what I’m terming visceral beliefs, and emotions are one type of visceral belief. Others are states like “hunger,” “thirst,” “ennui,” “age,” and so on.
I’ll quickly explain the other boxes, but I don’t want to dwell on them right now. Homeostatic state refers to the fact that our bodies are designed to monitor particular “needs.” Some of these needs are common to other animals. We monitor salt, and when we “need” salt, we crave it, and it tastes particularly good. We monitor temperature, and when we “need” temperature, warmth feels particularly good and we take actions to procure it. These homeostatic needs partly define the type of animal that we happen to be (Homo sapiens), and so we have social needs that, for example, might be absent from a turtle, and as mammals we engage in nurturing and attachment in ways that I would categorize as “motivational” (i.e., connected with homeostatic “need”). Finally, behavioral systems refers to the species typical way that we satisfy our homeostatic needs. Do we hunt in packs? Do we play? Do we perform mating rituals? Finally, learning, of course, can layer all sorts of complexity into this system, but as a starting point, it’s a decent way to begin thinking about the mechanisms constructing our psyche.

Emotions and feelings are visceral beliefs. A kind of perception that originates within the body, and which is built up from basic processes and learned expectations. Sometimes we attend to these “feelings” and at other times we do not, just like sometimes we attend to the clouds in the sky and sometimes we do not. Sometimes we purposefully “look away” from feelings in the same way that we might look away from a panhandler, or we learn to ignore feelings in the same way that we learn to ignore the train that passes by every night at 4:00. We feel tired, but push on through the night in order to complete an assignment. We feel sad, but believe that sadness is “weak” and ignore the sensations. The point is that just as the room you visually inhabit is partially constructed from color and lines and assumptions of depth, the emotional room you inhabit is constructed from the stuff of the body.
Soapbox Aside: I’ve been meaning to remind everyone that when it comes to psychology, we need to be careful about ascribing a particular state to everyone. Just as some individuals are “color blind,” not everyone experiences empathy or fear or anxiety. Not everyone experiences pain the way that you do. Some people see colors when they hear music. Some people experience extreme disgust to situations to which others merely shrug their shoulders. Some people are attracted to women. Some are attracted to men. But “men” and “women” are variable categories, too. Some are tall. Some are short. Some have penis-like appendages. Some don’t. There’s no such thing as a “real” woman or a “real” man. Not in any scientific sense, and most of us do know this when we pause to think about it, but there is a tendency to get sloppy. For example, the other day I was listening to the radio and a very reputable commentator said, “I believe that everyone is fundamentally good.” Depending on what the commentator meant, the odds are that, no, not everyone is fundamentally good. If the commentator meant that everyone has “fellow feeling,” that is wrong. Most might possess this perception, but there is variance. Some experience it more often, while others experience it less often. On the other hand, perhaps the commentator meant that all humans have the potential to be “good,” or the commentator might be using short-hand for a belief that all individuals possess “value,” but that is a very different thing that saying that everyone is fundamentally good. The latter statement is passive, shirks responsibility and is simply inaccurate. Variance is the norm, even if broad strokes (e.g., averages, medians, modal frequencies) allow for certain generalities. Speaking of which, there is a realted generality known in psychology at the fundamental attribution error. This a tendency for people to allow variance for themselves, while dismissing it for others. Why did you do poorly on the test? Because you didn’t get a good night’s sleep. Why did that other person do poorly on the test? Because they are stupid, lazy, a member of a racial category, etc. In this blog, if I make overarching generalizations I am either being lazy, or I am trying to make a broad point as efficiently as possible. Sometimes it makes sense to refer to averages, but it is important to always remember that there is almost always variance around and average, and that variance is normal.
A thought experiment
I have been going on for a bit about how our psyches are constructed things. But I’ve been doing so in kind of general terms. So, let’s take a breather and see if we can’t assemble a simple belief engine from some of the pieces that have shown up on the blog so far. Or if engineering isn’t your thing, you can think of this as a sort of recipe.
Ingredient List
1 c. Visual perception of faces
1 c. The other race effect
1 Tbs. Generalization
Stir with a dash of cultural experience
Faces. Faces are a construct of our visual system, and a lot could be said out them. For example, here is an image from a well-known experiment seeking to determine if infants are born with an innate ability to recognize face-like images

The basic idea is to take a face and show it to infants of different ages. Of course, you then need other images so that you can make comparisons. Like, maybe make sure that the infant isn’t simply responding to the nose, mouth, etc., no matter how they are arranged (Linear). Or maybe check out if it’s a triangular arrangement of stimuli that the infant “likes” and compare that a more normal face, and the same image with the triangular arrangement flipped. This is some of what psychologists do!
Whether infants are innately predisposed to respond to face-like images, over time, most of us become better at distinguishing between faces. When our eyes encounter a face-like stimulus they tend to bounce around in a manner that picks out particular features.

Orginal work done by Alfred Yarbus (1967) and image found here.
Like any skill, this is something at which we become better and more efficient with repeated practice. We don’t just pick out faces as generic visual objects, but individual faces for our friends, parents, siblings and so on. And yes, we know that all of this construction is happening in a brain, and since that is the case, damage to the brain can interfere with our ability to construct faces. Prosopagnosia is a syndrome that refers to an inability to recognize faces brought on by strokes / damage. Individuals experiencing prosopagnosia might be able to perfectly describe the features of a face: the nose, the color of they eyes, the shape of a chin – but they cannot “see” the face.
The Other Race Effect. As we encounter faces, we become more and more adept at pulling out features that allow us to efficiently “recognize” the individual attached to any particular arrangement of these features. The general thinking is that this process results in the creation of a prototypical face. You can think of this as being the weighted average of all of the face-features that an individual has encountered in their day-to-day living. That prototype is then going to become your psyche’s starting point for recognizing new faces. Just like a few posts back, when we talked about how our visual system has beliefs about depth, and size, and relative brightness, our visual system constructs beliefs about faces. One of these beliefs goes by the name the other race effect.
Basically, the other race effect refers to the fact that your psyche is better at recognizing prototypical faces. If you’ve ever tried to use money in another country, you’ll have an appropriate analogy. Even after living in Germany for four year, I would sometimes get hung up on counting out change. I had trouble remembering which coins went with which amounts, and strangely this made it more difficult to simply add up and subtract amounts. The other race effect is something like that. It refers to the fact that individuals who regularly experience faces within a particular ethnic / racial category find it harder to distinguish between faces outside of that category.
A study from 2007 published in Psychological Science provides a nice conceptual demonstration of the other race effect.
In this particular study, the researchers asked about the development of the effect. In other words, they asked whether very young children showed the effect, and if not, when did it become pronounced. Their subject pool consisted of Caucasian infants from three age groups: 3-month, 6-month, and 9-month. In the experiment, these infants were presented with faces from four “ethnic categories”: Caucasian, African, Middle-Eastern, and Chinese. Please note that these are the designations from the article. All of the faces were taken from students who were 23 – 27 years old.
The way that these experiments typically work, is that an infant will be shown a stimulus until they become bored. “Bored” is measured by the amount of time that the infant spends looking at a stimulus vs. looking elsewhere (remember, in science we have to measure something!). This “boredom” is referred to as habituation. Once an infant is habituated to a stimulus, an experimenter can show that infant another stimulus and ask: “Does the infant remain bored?” If so, then that means that the infant doesn’t recognize a difference between the two stimuli. On the other hand, if the infant’s attention perks up, then we can conclude that the infant DOES recognize a difference between the stimuli.
That is the logic that was used to examine the development of the other race effect in the Daley et al. study. Infants were be shown a particular face until they habituated to it. Then there were shown the same face along with another novel face. That novel face either came from the same or another ethnic category. The question was whether the infants would recognize the difference of novel faces within an ethnic category. For example, if the infants were habituated to a Chinese face, would they perk up when presented with a new Chinese face?

Here is their data. I’ve changed it from what was provided in the actual paper, because the data there consisted of numbers in a table. I took those numbers and created a graph that makes the same points. Any bars above the dotted line indicate that the infants “recognized” the novel faces as novel. 3-mo old infants essentially treated all faces as unique. 6-mo olds, though, treated Caucasian and Chinese faces as unique, while tending to clump African and Middle-Eastern faces into generic categories. Finally, at 9 months, the infants showed the full on “Other Race Effect.” They treated faces from their own ethnic group, Caucasian, as unique, but tended to treat the faces from the other three ethnic categories as generic.
Generalization. Ok, so we know that faces are visually constructed things. We also know that we tend to learn to distinguish between commonly encountered faces, and that is going to tend to produce better recognition of faces within our ethnic group as opposed to outside of ethnic group. All of this is simple engineering. Let’s start to push it in a direction that we’d connect with more traditional notions of belief. We’ll do this by reminding ourselves of a psychological phenomenon known as generalization.
Like so many things in psychology, generalization is conceptually simple, but incredibly complex in its details. The basic phenomenon is this. If you learn something about a situation, you will tend to transfer that learning to “similar” situations. This transfer to “similar” situations, contexts and stimuli is termed generalization, and it is seen in so many animals that it is considered a basic feature of learning. Here is an example of generalization in pigeons. Pigeons that have learned that a vertical line either indicates food or the absence of food, will tend to generalize that learning to other line orientations.

However, notice that I put “similar” in quotes. Usually we think of “similar” as sharing features. If you are humiliated when you recite a poem in 4th grade, then maybe you will feel emotions of humiliation whenever you enter any classroom. Classrooms, after all, are “similar.” However, when we use the term “similar” what we really mean is that your brain is not recognizing a situation as completely unique. Someone else’s brain might very well. Also, this is not to say that at some point in the future you won’t recognize difference. You might very well learn that situation A is quite different from situation B.
So “similar” is a subjective thing. When we transfer learning, feelings, and assumptions to new situations, this says more about what we as individuals recognize as “similar” at that particular moment. As an example, when we learn a new language, one of the humps we have to overcome is hearing sounds as unique that we start off hearing as generic. In any event, generalization is the phenomenon of transferring learning to “similar” situations and stimuli. But remember, “similar” means, to some degree, “not recognizing difference.”
A Dash of Cultural Experience. So here is where we mix all of our ingredients together to construct a larger belief. First, we’ve pointed out that our visual system uses features in the environment to construct faces. Whether some of this construction is innate, or not, is beside the point. Faces are constructed things. Second, we’ve pointed out that how this happens creates categories of faces that we recognize as unique, and categories of faces that we treat as generic. Thirdly, we’ve reminded ourselves that if stimuli are generic, then this means that they are “similar,” and learning will tend to generalize across similar stimuli. What will happen, then, if culture pulls out a single face from an ethnic group and portrays it in a particular way? For example, let’s suppose that we are Caucasian child from the Kelly et al study. We see a show that portrays a Caucasian as a criminal. Well, since we tend to treat Caucasian faces as unique, then we won’t generalize criminality to a broad range of Caucasian faces. On the other hand, if we see a show that portrays an African, Middle-Eastern, or Chinese individual as a criminal, we will be more likely to generalize “criminality” to a broad range of African, Middle-Eastern, or Chinese individuals. That’s the thought experiment for this blog post.
A Study of Gratitude
Since it is the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, how about a study about gratitude? This particular study comes from the lab of David DeSteno. Prof. DeSteno is at Northeastern University, and he is the PI for a group that studies emotional effects on prosocial behaviors. You could do worse than to read his book, Emotional Success: the power of gratitude, compassion and pride. I would quibble with some of the evolutionary accounts that he provides in the book, but the general gist – that emotions are informational, adaptive “lenses” – is an important perspective. I’ll definitely try to unpack this perspective a bit at some point in this blog.
Anyway, for this particular study, Desteno asks a question concerning impulsivity. The question is whether all emotions get in the way of non-impulsive, rational, deliberative choice. Or, are there particular emotional states that actually reduce impulsivity? Certainly the zeitgeist is that emotions are a hindrance to deliberation. Zen, man. That’s the ticket.
A modern psychologist, though, would tend to say that “Zen, man” is as much an emotion as “anger.” The issue isn’t clearing away emotion, so much as it is understanding the congruence between the decisions you are being asked / attempting to make and the emotional state from which you are attempting to make them. If you are being asked to saw a board in two, a hammer isn’t of much use. The same could be said of emotions. So, is there an emotional state that helps rational, deliberative choice?
That’s a loaded question, of course. So let’s anchor it with a more specific question. Are there particular emotions that make us less impulsive? This is the question that DeSteno et al sought to address in their study “Gratitude: a tool for addressing economic impatience” (DeSteno, Li, Dickens and Lerner, 2014).
Now, the first thing to appreciate about any scientific study, is that when a researcher asks about whether x affects y, x and y are going to be defined in operationable terms. This means, they are going to be defined in measurable terms. Not only that, but they are going to be defined in measurable terms that are described in such a way that other scientists can go out an perform the same measurements. Impulsivity is a word. You might be able to provide a meaning for it: “actuated or swayed by emotional or involuntary impulses” However, this definition is meaningless for a scientist. How do you determine actuated or swayed? What counts as an involuntary impulse? What counts as an impulse?
Here is how DeSteno et al operationalized impulsive behavior: How much money do I need to give you in T amount of time so that you will choose to wait rather than take a different choice of money now? For example in the image below a subject has been presented with a choice between $4.50 now versus $10.00 in 30 days. Which would you choose?

Impulsivity, then, is being measured in terms of a choice between a dollar amount now vs. a dollar amount in the future. Sometimes in the literature this is referred to as a temporal-discounting or delay-discounting curve, and the information it provides is essentially “how easily you can wait.” The more money I have to give you to wait, the higher your impulsivity score.
Ok, so in the the DeSteno et al study subjects will be primed with a particular emotion: happiness, neutrality, or gratitude. This is done by having the subjects in each of these groups write about an autobiographical moment in which they felt this emotion. Next, the subjects will be given a series of questions that ask them to rank (1 – 5) their current emotional state. Finally, the subjects will be given a series of choices between a dollar amount now versus a dollar amount in the future. By the way, subjects had a 1-in-3 chance of actually receiving one of the dollar choices that they made. If you were one of these lucky subjects, the experimenters randomly selected one of your choices (e.g., $30 in 6 months), and made it a reality.
- Trigger Emotions: Happy, Neutral, Grateful.
- Compare subjects in each group in terms of their impulsivity scale.
That’s the study. Here is what was found.

What this figure shows is the average impulsivity score for each group. The numbers on the y-axis can essentially be interpreted as a measure of patience. Specifically, they indicate the ratio between an amount of money now, and an equivalent psychological amount a year from now. In other words, a discount factor of .5 would mean that $10 now equals an offer of $20 a year from now. A discount factor of .1 would mean that $10 now equals $100 a year from now. In other words, you would need to pay the “.1 subject” five times as much money to wait a year, than you would need to pay a “.5 subject.”
Back to the figure, when you look at how the different emotional groups scored, it is clear that the gratitude group displayed more patience. This is true even when compared to another group that was feeling a positive emotion – the happy group. Feeling happy did not make a subject any more patient that feeling “neutral.” The only emotion of the three manipulated that improved impulsivity was gratitude.
Gratitude. Patience. The season stretches out towards winter and the cold settles in. Thanksgiving readies our waiting, keeping a future spring valued and available.
Happy Thanksgiving 2019!

[Edit: Talk about coincidence. Who should have a column in the NY Times, but David DeSteno! Give it a read to learn some more about the science of gratitude.]
Devil’s Shoals
I’m no fan of bad poetry, but I do understand the lyrical impulse — that attempt to connect pure sensation with something available to the declarative self. So, here’s something I wrote a while back, while living in the Northeast but thinking of my two grown-up daughters and reflecting on memories of growing up, myself, in southeastern Tennessee. Btw, as I continue to learn about HTML and the ins and outs of WordPress, I apologize for wonky layouts.
Devil’s
Shoals
(for Delphi and Lydia)
Before
the Hiwassee widens like a settled ribbon
of
sunlight across the hills, husk yellow and green,
where the old train bridge passes overhead —
before
the widening slow of the river
at the
gravel lot filled with the church buses
that carry the tubes for the weekend faith groups,
lies the last rapids, the Devil’s shoals.
And
when I was a kid canoes would eddy out there,
and pull
up to the beaten path that stepped up
boulders and blackberry brambles.
Where
the path leveled we’d follow
the
tracks laid straight, blasted out of shale,
and then
down the embankment to slip into the water
that sucked as smooth and as cold as any promise ever could.
Wading
out into the current, we held hands like sentries,
through
the rushed lashings, our breath catching
when the water hit the belly, until
we
dropped, one-by-one, buoyed
by our
life jackets past the shore’s retreat
as we
floated down into the mouth of the shoals
desperate of breath and arms flailing.
Water
slapped the face and pulled – pulled us below
to where
darker flows reversed and crossed
under the
heavy waves and sunlight.
Our
sneakered feet kicked out and fought,
our lungs
ached in their insistence, until hands
joined
the pull of preservers to heave us heavenward
where
eye-blinking vision washed up like fish.
Once
upon a time a boy lost his strength in the shoals,
and
crying out to his father for help,
was carried past the hitched boats.
Another
time a boy who had lost his father
and seen
his mother remarry a Methodist minister
took to the tracks, and walked the mile to the parking lot,
each stubborn
tie after each stubborn tie hammered firm.
Either
way, the devil sought us all —
like a misguided gift to the homesick-buried
in a
place where breath and Will battled for supremacy.
And
ever when the day closed, tired and content,
the youth
directors gathered up their charges
and
bussed them back to their beds
still hearing the rush of the shoals in the dusk of mid-summer.





















